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Abstract
Performance-based financing (PBF) schemes have been expanding rapidly across low and
middle income countries in the past decade, with considerable external financing from multi-
lateral, bilateral and global health initiatives. Many of these countries have been fragile and
conflict-affected (FCAS), but while the influence of context is acknowledged to be important
to the operation of PBF, there has been little examination of how it affects adoption and
implementation of PBF. This article lays out initial hypotheses about how FCAS contexts
may influence the adoption, adaption, implementation and health system effects of PBF.
These are then interrogated through a review of available grey and published literature (140
documents in total, covering 23 PBF schemes). We find that PBF has been more common
in FCAS contexts, which were also more commonly early adopters. Very little explanation of
the rationale for its adoption, in particular in relation with the contextual features, is given in
programme documents. However, there are a number of factors which could explain this,
including the greater role of external actors and donors, a greater openness to institutional
reform, and lower levels of trust within the public system and between government and
donors, all of which favour more contractual approaches. These suggest that rather than
emerging despite fragility, conditions of fragility may favour the rapid emergence of PBF.
We also document few emerging adaptations of PBF to humanitarian settings and limited
evidence of health system effects which may be contextually driven, but these require more
in-depth analysis. Another area meriting more study is the political economy of PBF and its
diffusion across contexts.
Introduction
Performance based financing (PBF) schemes typically aim to improve health services by
providing bonuses to service providers (usually facilities, but often with a portion paid to indi-
vidual staff) based on the verified quantity of outputs produced, modified by quality indicators.
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In many cases there is a division of functions between regulation, purchasing, fund-holding,
and service delivery [1–3]. PBF schemes have been expanding rapidly across low and middle
income countries in the past decade, focussed on maternal and child health services, with con-
siderable external financing from multilateral, bilateral and global health initiatives [3]. The
initial rationale was to align provider incentives with public policy objectives, especially linked
to the Millennium Development Goals—boosting uptake of services such as supervised deliv-
eries, antenatal care and immunisation [4]. More recently, focus has shifted to the need for
greater focus on quality of care, as increased utilisation was not reflected in equivalent health
gains [5] and also on how PBF might be catalytic of wider health system changes [1,6,7].
There is a growing literature on PBF’s impact on different health care indicators [8–14] and
also on its ‘theory of change’ (understanding the mechanisms through which PBF may or
may not work) [15,16], as well as analysing the extent to which PBF is distinct from previous
approaches [17].
It is clear from the early literature that PBF is unlikely to be a homogenous intervention
and that its modalities and effects will be highly dependent on context [13]. However, the liter-
ature on PBF has been surprisingly thin in its discussion of how different contexts may influ-
ence the adoption, adaption and design, implementation and effects of PBF programmes [18].
Additionally, PBF has been promoted as the preferred health financing (and health system)
intervention of many donors, raising concerns which echo earlier debates about the promotion
of standardised models by development partners [19]. Monitoring and evaluation strategies by
leading funding agencies rarely aim to isolate or examine contextual factors [20,21], despite
evaluation reports which highlight that PBF will work differently in different contexts [22].
However, specific contextual features, and in particular those related to fragile, conflict-
affected states (FCAS), are likely to have particular impact on the adoption, adaption, imple-
mentation and health system effects of PBF.
The term ‘FCAS’ is an increasingly used definition [23,24] covering a very diverse group of
states disrupted by violence, armed conflict, natural disasters, and all sorts of governance crises
[25]. There is a growing body of literature [26] lending support to the idea that the analysis of
health systems in such circumstances needs to pay close attention to their political, economic
as well as social contexts, as these determine critical distortions.
This article examines specifically the influence of context on PBF programmes in relation
to FCAS. There are a number of reasons for this choice of focus. The first is that many of
the early PBF schemes emerged in FCAS countries (such as initially in Cambodia, and then
Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of the Congo) and it is interesting to understand
why that might have been. Secondly, the burden of ill-health is increasingly focused in FCAS
and so the role of PBF in addressing these health needs is particularly relevant to unpack.
Finally, to the extent to which there has been discussion about PBF in FCAS settings, the argu-
ments have been conflicting—with some arguing that PBF is unlikely to be effective in envi-
ronments with, for example, low ability to absorb risk and weak information systems [27,28],
while others point out that precisely in situations of weak institutions there is more potential
for PBF to re-align relationships and improve accountability [29]. Furthermore, a recent
agenda setting exercise on priority themes for research on health care in FCAS listed under-
standing the opportunities and challenges for PBF in FCAS as one of the priority research
questions [30].
This article’s objective is to interrogate existing grey and published literature on how the
FCAS context influences the adoption, adaption, implementation and health system effects of
PBF in order to support or refute a set of hypotheses about their interaction. By ‘context’, we
understand, in this paper, the differences that exist between countries in terms of socio-eco-
nomic structure and political organisation, including the way the health system is organised.
Performance based financing in fragile and conflict-affected health systems
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195301 April 3, 2018 2 / 27
As our focus is on FCAS, we are particularly interested in fault lines within society, economy,
and political system that are inherited from the period of conflict.
Methods
Development of hypotheses
The authors started by developing hypotheses about how FCAS contexts might interact with
PBF, to be tested against the current published empirical evidence. These hypotheses mainly
draw on the framework developed by Witter et al. in 2013 [1] and elements hinted at in the
limited literature on PBF and FCAS [29,31,32]. We do not necessarily suggest that they are
exhaustive, rather they proved to be useful to frame the results. Other insights also arose from
our analysis and further work may propose and test other hypotheses.
Concerning adoption, the hypotheses we looked at included the ideas that FCAS might:
1. Allow more entry for external players (e.g. donors and NGOs) to influence policy innova-
tions such as PBF—so increasing the prevalence and possibly fragmentation (if multiple
players) of PBF programmes in FCAS;
2. Let those external players drive (largely or partly) the reform process, at least in the initial
stage;
3. With top-level managers thinner on the ground and more dependent on external funders,
they are likely to be especially open to international influences / ‘new’ models;
4. FCAS societies may also have lower levels of interpersonal trust that make formal, con-
tractual, arrangements less likely to be resisted / more likely to appear a solution for
everybody;
5. Have higher fears of misappropriation / misallocation of funding, making PBF an appeal-
ing solution because of its apparent control mechanisms;
6. Have higher local/regional interests to satisfy and weaker central institutions, making the
‘hyper-devolution’ (health facilities having greater autonomy in management) an appeal-
ing option;
7. Reduce organised resistance (through weaker labour organisations, for example) to such
innovations—leading to increased prevalence but also possibly swifter scale-up.
Interestingly, all of these hypotheses seem to work in the direction of increasing the likeli-
hood of PBF being introduced in FCAS.
In terms of design and adaption, we reviewed the hypotheses that:
8. With reduced system capacity to manage and more players, possibly not well coordi-
nated, there would be increased challenges of uniform scale up in FCAS—with more vari-
ety and local adaptation.
Finally, in relation to implementation and health system effects, a number of hypotheses
emerge—it is interesting to note that here expectations about the potential success of PBF in
FCAS are more mixed. Hypotheses include that:
9. With reduced capacity to fund, FCAS would generally face higher sustainability chal-
lenges for PBF;
10. Looser hierarchical controls and less reliable funding flows to lower levels both make PBF
an attractive modality as a way for the centre to regain leverage; they do however rely on
Performance based financing in fragile and conflict-affected health systems
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strong purchasing skills at different levels and without these PBF will be less predictable
in its health system effects.
The second analytical phase of our work consisted in gathering evidence from a literature
review, in order to examine these expectations and to populate an existing framework devel-
oped to assess the interactions between PBF and health systems [1]. The framework starts with
a focus on the context in which PBF is adopted and then looks at policy adaption and design,
followed by implementation and effects on the six health system pillars (Fig 1).
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the literature review were defined. We included PBF pro-
grammes in the health sector (exclusively), which are defined as supply-side payments target-
ing managers and providers, usually including volume and quality of healthcare indicators [1].
In order to maintain some homogeneity of intervention, we did not include ‘contracting’
approaches that are also part of the ‘family’ of Results-based Financing (RBF) schemes such
as ‘performance-based contracting’, ‘management contracting’, or ‘contracting-out’ [2]. We
also did not include demand-side programmes such as conditional cash transfers (CCTs) and
vouchers.
Countries were included in the review based on their classification as FCAS in the World
Bank’s harmonized list of fragile situations [23] for any year over the last decade, as this was
the period in which most PBF programmes were developed in low and middle income coun-
tries. The combined list for 2007–2017 includes 53 countries (S1 Table).
Fig 1. The five domains for understanding PBF-health systems interactions—A framework. Source: [1].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195301.g001
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We were aware that much of the evidence on PBF is ‘grey’ and so used a very broad defini-
tion of literature, to include published academic articles, but also published and unpublished
documents, reports, presentations, blog posts etc., with the proviso that they focused on PBF
in the FCAS countries, with particular attention to any documents which included a descrip-
tion of the context and of features related to fragility. The review included documents in
English, French and Portuguese.
Search strategy
First, an online literature search was run which included:
• published literature, searched on Google Scholar using key words such as “results-based
financing” combined with health and fragility;
• the websites of DfID, WHO and World Bank, which were searched using key words which
included “results/performance based financing” combined with context terms (e.g. country
names), fragility and health care;
• RBF-focussed websites were searched manually by 27 March 2017. These included:
• The World Bank’s RBF website (https://www.rbfhealth.org/) (all the 110 webpages of links
to documents/resources that were available);
• DFID’s website (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=
department-for-international-development) using the keywords “performance- based
financing” or “results- based financing” + “context” (first 20 pages of results);
• WHO’s website (http://www.who.int/publications/en/), using the keywords “performance-
based financing” or “results- based financing” + “context”;
• The discussions in the Google Group of the PBF Community of Practice (CoP) (https://
groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/performance-based-financing), using the key word
‘context’, in both French and English. The PBF CoP has more than 2,000 members, includ-
ing PBF experts and practitioners, implementers, policy-makers, donors and researchers
with a broad geographical representation and a focus on sub-Saharan Africa.
• All the resources and blog-posts of the website Health Financing in Africa (http://www.
healthfinancingafrica.org/resources.html);
• The national RBF/PBF portals for each country: Cameroon (http://www.fbrcameroun.org/),
CAR (http://www.pbfcar.org/), Burundi (http://www.fbpsanteburundi.bi/), Nigeria (http://
pbfnigeria.org), Chad (http://www.fbrtchad.org/, DR Congo (http://www.fbrsanterdc.cd/),
and Sierra Leone (http://pbfsierraleone.org/);
• The websites of Cordaid, a major PBF implementer/funder (https://www.cordaid.org) and
SINA Health, a consultancy firm that worked with Cordaid on many PBF projects (http://
www.sina-health.com/).
Secondly, a consultation with experts involved in PBF was launched via the PBF CoP using
the website Collectivity (http://www.thecollectivity.org/en/projects/26). The objectives of our
research were laid out and experts asked to share documents describing the PBF programmes
in their countries, and in particular, the reasons why the PBF scheme was introduced, its objec-
tives and the challenges it aims/aimed to address, and the context in which it was introduced.
Implementation or procedural manuals, project documents, interim reports on implementa-
tion, working papers, and internal analysis were solicited.
Performance based financing in fragile and conflict-affected health systems
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Data gathered
In total, 140 documents were reviewed, covering 23 countries. Table 1 gives detail of the docu-
ments reviewed by country, type and source. On average, we reviewed 6 documents per coun-
try, ranging from 14 for the DR Congo and 13 for Burundi to 1 for Djibouti. In terms of type
of documents, the majority are academic papers, either published or unpublished (28, 20%),
PBF operational manuals (25, 18%) and research reports (22, 16%). PBF programme docu-
ments (18, 13%) and evaluations (16, 11%) are also relevant among the documents retrieved.
The remaining are operational reports (7, 5%) or other miscellaneous documents (24, 17%).
In terms of sources, the majority of the documents (59, 42%) were retrieved via the CoP con-
sultation and the experts who shared a range of documents and information with us, while
the remaining documents were retrieved through the web (53, 38%) and literature searches
(28, 20%).
Data analysis
Data were extracted from each document using a series of pre-identified, inductive themes,
which are derived from the conceptual framework and adapted to the aim of this study, with a
focus on exploring the influence of the context, and in particular of the fragility features of the
context, on the adoption and implementation of PBF (Table 2).
Each researcher was responsible for the review of documents referring to a set of countries.
Data extraction was done manually into an Excel spread sheet organised by themes (columns)
and countries (rows). This allowed us to summarise and synthetize information, compare and
contrast different experiences, interpret data in relation to contexts and map emerging pat-
terns across countries. Preliminary findings were discussed between the research team before
drafting the article.
Results
Exploring patterns of PBF distribution
We found documents on PBF programmes (on-going or implemented over the period) in 23
out of the 53 FCAS countries identified (43%) [We are aware of a small scale, simple version
of PBF implemented in South Sudan (Upper Nile) by Cordaid with World Bank funding,
between 2013 and 2016, with some interruptions due to political crisis and violence. However,
we were not able to retrieve and review any documents on it, and therefore that project is not
included in our analysis]. The World Bank’s Performance-Based Financing Toolkit reports that
in 2015 there were 34 PBF schemes, at either pilot or national level, among the 51 countries of
sub-Saharan Africa [3]. Of these, 19 (56%) are implemented in countries that are included in
the FCAS list (note that there are 27 countries included in the FCAS list among the 51 coun-
tries of sub-Saharan Africa). Looking at the list of countries with PBF schemes in 2006, all are
FCAS (Rwanda is included only on the OECD list). This indicates an earlier and higher rate of
adoption of PBF among FCAS countries, although the difference is not substantial overall.
More striking is the pattern in timing of the introduction of PBF between FCAS and non-
FCAS settings. Before 2006, the PBF Toolkit identifies only three countries in sub-Saharan
Africa which had PBF programmes (Rwanda, Burundi and the DR Congo) [3], while our anal-
ysis suggests that PBF existed at small scale also in Cameroon and Coˆte d’Ivoire. Interestingly,
all these countries are included in the FCAS list, suggesting that PBF may have been intro-
duced earlier in fragile and post-conflict settings, often as a response to the need of health sys-
tem’s reorganization in the recovery phase. Additionally, PBF programmes seem to have been
scaled-up at national level earlier in FCAS settings compared to other low and middle income
Performance based financing in fragile and conflict-affected health systems
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Table 1. Documents reviewed by country, type and source.
Country Num. of documents reviewed Type of document Sources
Afghanistan 7 • Academic papers (4)
• PBF programme document (2)
• Operational reports (1)
• Literature search (4)
• Web search (2)
• CoP/expert consultation (1)
Burundi 16 • Academic papers (6)
• Working papers (3)
• Research reports (4)
• Operational report (2)
• PBF operational manual (1)
• Web search (11)
• Literature search (3)
• CoP/expert consultation (2)
Cambodia 8 • Academic papers (3)
• PBF programme documents (2)
• Research reports (3)
• Literature search (3)
• Web search (5)
Cameroon 7 • PBF operational manual (1)
• PBF programme documents (2)
• Research reports (2)
• Academic papers (2)
• Web search (4)
• Literature search (2)
• CoP/expert consultation (1)
Central African Republic (CAR) 8 • PBF operational manual (1)
• PBF programme evaluation (1)
• Research reports (2)
• Programme documents (4)
• Web search (4)
• Literature search (1)
• CoP/expert consultation (3)
Chad 5 • PBF operational manual (1)
• PBF programme evaluations (2)
• Academic papers (2)
• Web search (1)
• Literature search (2)
• CoP/expert consultation (2)
Comoros 6 • PBF programme evaluations (4)
• PBF operational manual (1)
• PBF strategic document (1)
• CoP/expert consultation (6)
Congo 6 • PBF operational manual (2)
• PBF strategic document (1)
• Powerpoint presentations (3)
• Web search (3)
• CoP/expert consultation (3)
Coˆte d’Ivoire 5 • PBF protocols and operational manuals (3)
• National PBF strategy (1)
• Donor project document (1)
• Web search (1)
• CoP/expert consultation (4)
Djibouti 1 • PBF operational manual • CoP/expert consultation
DR Congo 14 • Academic papers (3)
• Working papers (3)
• Research reports (2)
• Operational report (4)
• Impact evaluation (1)
• PBF operational manual (1)
• Web search (6)
• Literature search (3)
• CoP/expert consultation (5)
The Gambia 5 • PBF operational manual
• Baseline evaluations (3)
• Donor project document (1)
• Web search (3)
• CoP/expert consultation (2)
Guinea 3 • PBF operational manual (1)
• PBF programme document (1)
• PBF programme evaluation (1)
• CoP/expert consultation
Guinea-Bissau 1 • PBF programme document (1) • CoP/expert consultation (1)
(Continued)
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countries. Indeed, the first (and for the time being, only) three countries to have introduced
PBF nation-wide are Rwanda (2008), Burundi (2010) and Sierra Leone (2011), all FCAS coun-
tries. We also note that the implementation of the early PBF programmes follows the introduc-
tion of the ‘contracting’ approach in other FCAS settings, such as Cambodia (also the setting
of an early PBF experiment, nested within a broader contracting approach—[33]), Haiti,
Afghanistan and Liberia. In these countries, various models of contracting arrangements
started respectively in 1997, 1999, 2003 and 2009, which is—in most cases—earlier than the
beginning of PBF implementation, which was introduced in Rwanda in 2002, DR Congo in
2005, Burundi, Cameroon and Coˆte d’Ivoire in 2006. This suggests there may have been an
evolution in supported models from ‘contracting’ to PBF.
In terms of type of programme implemented, the analysis shows that the PBF arrangements
that are most commonly in place across FCAS are those described in the World Bank’s PBF
Toolkit (perhaps unsurprisingly, since the World Bank is often the funder of PBF programmes,
Table 1. (Continued)
Country Num. of documents reviewed Type of document Sources
Haiti 4 • Academic papers (1)
• PBF programme documents (2)
• Research reports (1)
• Web search (3)
• Literature search (1)
Laos PDR 7 • Academic paper
• PBF programme document (2)
• Research report (2)
• PBF operational manual (2)
• Web search (4)
• Literature search (1)
• CoP/expert consultation (2)
Liberia 5 • Research report (1)
• PBF programme evaluation (1)
• PBF operational manual (1)
• Academic paper (unpublished) (1)
• Technical brief (1)
• Web search (1)
• Literature search (1)
• CoP/expert consultation (3)
Mali 8 • PBF operational manuals (2)
• PBF programme evaluation (1)
• Research report (1)
• PBF programme document (2)
• Policy briefs (2)
• Literature search (1)
• CoP/expert consultation (7)
Nigeria 5 • PBF operational manual (1)
• Academic papers (2)
• Academic paper and presentation (unpublished) (2)
• Web search (1)
• Literature search (2)
• CoP/expert consultation (2)
Rwanda 11 • PBF operational manual (1)
• Academic papers (6)
• Research papers (4)
• Web search (8)
• Literature search (2)
• CoP/expert consultation (1)
Sierra Leone 6 • PBF operational manual (1)
• PBF programme evaluations (2)
• Academic papers (2)
• Blog (1)
• Web search (1)
• Literature search (2)
• CoP/expert consultation (3)
Tajikistan 3 • PBF operational manual (2)
• PBF programme evaluations (1)
• Web search (2)
• CoP/expert consultation (1)
Zimbabwe 6 • PBF operational manual (1)
• PBF programme evaluations (3)
• Other programme evaluation (1)
• Academic paper (1)
• CoP/expert consultations (6)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195301.t001
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as detailed below). The vast majority of the programmes analysed cover a comprehensive list
of indicators, usually related to the basic and complementary health service package that facili-
ties are supposed to provide, with a focus on maternal and child health. However, a few pro-
grammes, in particular early and small-scale ones had a disease-specific focus. This is the case,
for example, for the early pilots implemented with PEPFAR funding in Coˆte d’Ivoire since
2006 [34]. S2 Table provides further information on the PBF programmes analysed, their fea-
tures and timing of implementation.
Exploring patterns of PBF adoption
Following the framework proposed by Witter et al. [1], we looked first at PBF adoption and
policy formulation. In this section, we attempt to find patterns across settings and to link them
to the initial hypotheses on FCAS settings. It is important to stress that those hypotheses are
not mutually exclusive; multiple hypotheses can hold at the same time in a same country.
Table 2. Thematic codes for data extraction and analysis.
Main themes Sub-themes
Description of PBF programme Overviewof PBF and operational detail (e.g., dates of pilots/
programs, funders, geographical coverage, type of services and
facilities covered, etc.)
Context Nature of conflict/fragility
Historical features
Socio-cultural features
Political features
Governance and administrative structures
Burden of disease
Health system organisation
Policy formulation Role of external actors (e.g., donors and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs))
Role of internal actors (within health sector and outside—e.g.
Ministry of Finance or Presidency)
Interplay between actors
Design of PBF Specific contextual issues/challenges PBF aims to address
Adaptation of PBF design to context
PBF implementation Phases of PBF implementation (if relevant)
Overall operational challenges (in particular in relation to
contextual variables)
Operational challenges in uniform implementation within country
Changes/adaptations of PBF during implementation
Political support to PBF during implementation and scale-up (or
failure to scale-up)
Institutional support/challenges during implementation and scale-
up
Financial sustainability of implementation
Effect on health system, with reference to
contextual and FCAS features
Evidence of impact on health outcomes
Evidence of impact on governance
Evidence of impact on healthcare financing
Evidence on impact on HRH
Evidence on impact on drugs and equipment
Evidence on impact on health information system
Evidence on impact on service delivery
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195301.t002
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We found that only a minority of reviewed documents justifies the introduction of PBF
schemes in relation to the specific country settings, and these do so primarily by flagging the
low achievements of the country in terms of health coverage, quality of care, or efficiency of
services—or more often a combination of these reasons. These, broad ones are often the only
mentions of contextual elements shaping PBF and its adoption. The logical link between this
situation and the introduction of PBF—that is, the theory of change with respect to the coun-
try’s situation—is frequently left quite loose, especially in documents produced in recent years.
Most of the early documents, those written in the 2000s, allude to the idea of extrinsic motiva-
tion of health workers and the need to rebuild the local health system (which, they argue, can
be done through PBF). The documents introducing and commenting on the early schemes in
Rwanda and Burundi [35,36] underline that input-based approaches did not seem to produce
good results in a short time-frame and, therefore, output-based models ought to be given a
chance. The link between experiences of conflict and fragility and the emergence of PBF is
almost never explicit in the documents we reviewed, the main exception being early Rwanda
PBF documents [37].
In addition, in order to explore how contextual elements are considered when discussing
PBF adoption, we conducted an analysis of the PBF Community of Practice using the key-
word ‘context’, and we noted that this too led to few results. A few members highlighted, in the
Google-group discussions around 2010–2012, that ‘context’ was key but never really explained
what element of context mattered and how. A discussion of the first systematic review of PBF
(the 2012 Cochrane review—[13]) renewed this debate, with people noting that most studies
have a quantitative bias that leads them to overlook contextual factors and the role they play.
On the Google group, the last substantial discussion of context took place in 2014 and the mes-
sage at that point was different, saying that “context should not lead us to alter the principles of
PBF” and that “PBF can also make the context more positive”.
We then interrogated the literature to test our initial hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses
(1–3) is not linked to fragility per se but to the larger-than-usual place external actors often
have in FCAS. Indeed, it appeared that a key element to drive the adoption of PBF has been
the presence and influence of external actors—donors, international organisations and NGOs
—that are able to convince the government to implement, or let them implement, pilot or
more fully fledged PBF schemes that they see as the best way to making rapid progress in
improving health-care services and realising health development plans (e.g. in the Republic of
Congo and Burundi). In recent years, the rhetoric of these external donors as reflected in the
documents reviewed has particularly relied on PBF as the best way to achieve universal health
coverage (e.g., [38]).
The literature review did reveal a very clear presence of such external actors at the onset and
throughout the implementation of PBF schemes, with some very visible actors such as the
NGO Cordaid (Caritas Netherlands) and the World Bank. It is possible to discern two main
patterns of interaction between those external actors and local governments: (1) a piecemeal
approach whereby PBF is first implemented in a pilot area with little government’s involvement
and then, sometimes after a few other pilots, scaled up to large portions or the entire country;
and (2) a full-scale approach in which the external actor strategically influences the set-up of a
large scale or nationwide scheme, with the government’s close involvement. The first scenario
is more common in countries where PBF started early, before 2007–2010. The list of countries
includes Central African Republic (CAR), Coˆte d’Ivoire, Mali, Cameroon, Burundi, Lao PDR,
Rwanda, DR Congo, and the Gambia and Tajikistan (two exceptions in terms of timing as their
schemes started in 2012). The rationale for the piecemeal approach, as found in the documents,
seems to be for the external actor to test PBF but also to introduce national actors to the con-
cepts and working of PBF, and to showcase and promote the idea. The version of PBF that is
Performance based financing in fragile and conflict-affected health systems
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introduced through those pilots can be relatively independent from the health authorities (e.g.
CAR—[39]), with the organisation piloting PBF creating the purchasing agency and carrying
out performance verification. Even in cases where good collaboration with health authorities is
claimed (e.g. Burundi—[40]), early pilots tend to operate outside of government frameworks.
Ad-hoc PBF policies are typically drafted after the pilot projects, immediately before the
introduction of a larger project or the PBF scale-up (e.g., Coˆte d’Ivoire, Comoros—[41,42]).
Whether such policies reflect genuine changes in strategy from the Ministry of Health (MoH),
independently of proposed funding, is not possible to tell from our sources.
It must be stressed that the documents that were reviewed and that were part of the effort to
‘sell’ the PBF model rarely provided very rigorous evidence of the impact of PBF: causal frame-
works are usually weak, possibly in part because evaluations, when they exist, have often been
designed well after a pilot has started (preventing the use of more rigorous evaluation methods
such as, for instance, randomised control trial or sometimes even difference-in-difference).
Most documents provide anecdotal evidence, which is usually presented for what it is, but has,
nevertheless, been used to substantiate success story narratives. Rwanda is an exception: it had
an early, rigorous, impact evaluation supported by the World Bank [8,35]. Most of the PBF
pilots reviewed were succeeded by a larger project, often involving the same external actor(s),
and the documents related to this new project inevitably mentioned the encouraging pilot
scheme as a key element for the new project. For example, Gautier mentions that in Mali the
apparent results of the PBF pilot generated a strong engagement of national authorities and
led to its inclusion in the strategic plan for the health sector ([43]–emphasis added), while in
Burundi there is mention of the good adhesion of the different actors [10]. In one case, Sierra
Leone, the pattern was reversed: an NGO small-scale pilot took place after the national project
had been on-going for a few years. The objective of the pilot was, however, the same: to dem-
onstrate that PBF could work well in a context were the national level PBF was not considered
as working particularly well [44]. Whether this showcasing strategy is, in fact, effective and
required is not possible to say; it may be that the external influence was such that PBF did not
need to be ‘sold’ at all. In DR Congo, documents are explicit about the role of donors pushing
for and funding PBF (e.g. [45]).
The second pattern consists in the immediate launch of larger projects, with donor funding,
in almost all cases from the World Bank, and with the involvement of the local Ministry of
Health. This was the case for Djibouti, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Chad, Zimbabwe, Liberia, and
the Republic of Congo. In many of those countries, the introduction of PBF happened slightly
later than in the first set of countries. It should be added that the ‘showcasing strategy’ may
have applied here too, with study tours and workshops being arranged to countries where PBF
was already up and running, such as Burundi, Rwanda and the DR Congo, as well as Camer-
oon [46]. Such international tours and cross-country references are not limited to cases of the
full-scale approach: Burundi’s PBF documents are full of references to Rwanda that add to
domestic success stories (e.g. [47]).
These two sequences and the top-down, externally-driven, processes are probably not
FCAS-specific. A recent study on Tanzania concludes that “the P4P policy process was highly
political with external actors playing a significant role in influencing the agenda in Tanzania,
leaving less space for the Government of Tanzania to provide leadership in the process. Nor-
way in particular, took a leading role in setting the agenda” (p. 1) [48]. Other examples of
the key role played by external actors include Mozambique and Kenya [49]. The hypothesis,
though, is that the imbalance is even stronger in FCAS, which have less capacity or financial
possibility to critically assess or modify projects from external partners. It may be further
accentuated by the weaker policy and regulatory frameworks of FCAS, as described below.
This may explain why most of the early PBF experiences were in FCAS.
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It is also interesting to map the role of a small number of external actors in the diffusion of
PBF geographically and other time. The series of maps presented below shows how PBF spread
to FCAS in the past the 10 years (Figs 2 to 5). Some funders, in particular Cordaid, USAID
(for example, in Liberia) and the European Union (DR Congo) experimented with the first
schemes. In some cases, schemes co-existed and, over the past ten years, countries like DR
Congo and Burundi have seen respectively seven and six PBF schemes implemented on their
territory as new funders and implementers arrived (Fig 2). In the more recent years (especially
since 2012), as the approach become more popular and more visible (it was, for instance, very
visibly featured in institutional website, social media, and international conferences), the
World Bank and multilateral donors (UNICEF, GAVI, Global Fund, etc.) have become key
players (Figs 4 and 5). Actors like Cordaid largely contributed to promoting the approach
through conferences and communication campaigns. They were also venturing into a number
of new countries (Figs 4 and 5).
A pattern in the adoption of PBF which follows influential external individuals and institu-
tions was also noted (Fig 6). Although not directly discussed in the documents we reviewed,
the authorship and acknowledgements reveal a geographic pattern in the diffusion of PBF,
Fig 2. Diffusion of PBF, by external funder. Note: figures indicate the number of different PBF schemes
implemented in 2002–2016. Source: compiled by the authors using the documents presented in S1 Table (in particular
programme documents).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195301.g002
Fig 3. Diffusion of PBF, schemes by funder (2007). Source: compiled by the authors using the documents presented
in S1 Table (in particular programme documents).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195301.g003
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across the Great Lakes and initially markedly in French-speaking countries, in which (exter-
nal) individuals (Soeters, Fritsche, Meessen, to name but a few) and organizations (Cordaid,
AEDES, World Bank) played a key role. For example, the presence of AEDES’ technical assis-
tant, who had been previously working in the (EU-funded) PBF scheme in DR Congo was
important to introduce the concept in Comoros (personal communication). One study links
Cordaid interest for, and implementation of, performance-based approaches to the changes
in the organization of the Dutch bilateral development cooperation and the reorientation
towards results [50]. Mapping the diffusion of PBF across FCAS by Cordaid and AEDES,
we find a set of initial experiences in central Africa -Rwanda, DR Congo (South Kivu) and
Burundi for Cordaid and DR Congo for AEDES. It is in those countries that the two organisa-
tions developed their expertise on PBF in fragile settings. The creation of a community of prac-
tice early in the process [51] and the development of study tours has probably also contributed
to anchoring the central African experiences as references. It must be noted that the maps
below do not include non-FCAS countries, although experiences of these individuals and orga-
nisations in non-FCAS countries have, of course, also influenced the diffusion of PBF in FCAS
countries.
Fig 5. Diffusion of PBF, schemes by funder (2017). Source: compiled by the authors using the documents presented
in S1 Table (in particular programme documents).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195301.g005
Fig 4. Diffusion of PBF, schemes by funder (2012). Source: compiled by the authors using the documents presented
in S1 Table (in particular programme documents).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195301.g004
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Our fourth and fifth hypothesis were linked to the type of societies FCAS are and the sort
of government they have: they typically are societies with a very low level of (interpersonal)
trust, whose governments have low capacity, in particular to manage funds in an appropriate
manner. PBF may appear as providential with respect to both issues: it substitutes difficult
(interpersonal) relations with clear-cut contracts and sets clear financial procedures, often
sending external agents to manage funds.
Few documents explicitly note that the lack of trust between levels of the health system
and widespread corruption and lack of accountability were influential in the adoption of PBF
(hypothesis 4). Between the lines, though, there are acknowledgments that PBF fits well in the
agendas of the societies that are being rebuilt. Toonen et al. [32] explain that the entry point
for PBF in Mali was “lack of trust between these actors [i.e., actors at different levels of health
systems] and confusion about the distribution of their roles and responsibilities” (p. 43) at
decentralized levels, as “all felt responsible for health services at decentralized level” (p. 38).
They also argue [32]that PBF in Mali may ultimately contribute to improving this situation of
mistrust because a new framework (PBF) is established for collaboration. The situation is simi-
lar in other countries: in Burundi, a country deeply affected by low interpersonal trust, the
concept of PBF faced very little resistance within the MoH and was presented as part of the
new good governance package, beyond the fault lines inherited from the past [52]. Burundi is
far from being the only country where PBF echoes aspirations (or at least a political discourse
of) accountability: a report from Cameroon highlights that one of the elements that contrib-
uted to putting PBF on the MoH’s agenda was that it was in line with the political discourse
toward more accountability and the Presidential priority of the fight against corruption [53].
PBF however does not seek to address the root of mistrust between local actors.
The lack of trust can also be between donors and the government (hypothesis 5), and
is not specific to PBF or to FCAS. Few documents explicitly discuss this issue but in Liberia,
Sondorp and Coolen [54] found that “USAID opted to set up a programme, close to but
Fig 6. Diffusion of PBF (Cordaid and AEDES). Note: arrows indicate the next country where the organisation
implemented PBF. Source: compiled by the authors using the documents presented in S1 Table and information
available on the websites of AEDES, Cordaid, and SINA Health.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195301.g006
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essentially separate from government. [. . . It] intended to provide a mechanism which gives
the government more leadership but with a number of checks and balances in actual disburse-
ments” (p. 24).
In particular, fiduciary concerns and the perceived lack of capacity of the government to
manage external funds provide one of the possible rationales for implementing PBF schemes
that introduce a purchasing function clearly detached from the government. This may take the
form of a new non-governmental agency funded by international aid that persist years after
the schemes have started (e.g. DR Congo, with the creation of Purchasing Agencies in the
form of the Etablissements d’Utilité Publique, EUP, or the Agences d’Achat de Performance,
AAP, the latter being also created in NGO-run PBF projects in other countries). In other
places, the role is given to newly created ‘PBF project implementation units’. In this case, the
implementation unit is officially embedded within government, but in fact, follows the pattern
of an independent service authority [55] with its staff paid by international aid and the entity
largely ‘preserved’ or isolated from government. The motivation for such mechanism appears
to come from both government and donors. The Coˆte d’Ivoire’s World Bank PAD specifies
that “the government of Coˆte d’Ivoire requested to use a ring-fenced financing mechanism for
the fiduciary aspects of the project” (p. 40) [56]. Sometimes, as in the case of Zimbabwe, the
country simply cannot be directly engaged by the donor (the World Bank, in this case) as it is
in arrears. An external party, Cordaid was then chosen by the donor to play this role [57]. Zim-
babwe and Coˆte d’Ivoire remain exceptions, not in the sense that there is a ring-fenced mecha-
nism, but rather in the sense that documents explicitly acknowledge that this arrangement is
motivated by state fragility. Such arrangements where the purchasing agencies are external to
the government are always described as transitory.
It is interesting to note that non-FCAS countries, such as Benin and Senegal, also have
project implementation units and external implementing agencies. We were unable to assess
whether FCAS country are substantially more likely to have such mechanisms or whether
this is simply countries following a ‘trend’ established in some of the early PBF countries.
We found that project implementation units and external implementing agencies are not sys-
tematically associated to a particular donor either. What some FCAS countries such as the DR
Congo seem to exemplify, though, is that the state of fragility—namely, the recognized lack of
financial management capacity of the government—makes it possible to implement complex
schemes where important functions (purchasing and implementation) remain outside govern-
ment for a long time. They are deemed, possibly rightfully so, too complicated for the state to
manage [58]. This also means that, in those cases, PBF may not be doing much to reinforce the
capacities of the state (a key part of its fragility).
Our sixth hypothesis was linked to the socio-economic and political distortions engendered
by conflict: de facto decentralisation, and the flexibility of new institutions, including per
diem mentalities inherited from humanitarian interventions. All might make FCAS countries
less resistant to PBF-types of innovations. However, the hypothesis that PBF finds a more fer-
tile ground in FCAS because they are more decentralised and therefore less prone to resistance
did not find much echo in the documents. A reason may be in the way we had framed this
hypothesis in the beginning: the sort of decentralisation we had in mind is a de facto decentral-
isation with health facilities and health district having become (in actual practice, rather than
formally) more autonomous in their management because of periods of war during which the
state struggled to ensure direct contact with and control over them. However, because of the
informal nature of such decentralisation, an explicit discussion of it is unlikely in the docu-
ments, and was rarely found. Only in one of the most extreme cases, the DR Congo, it was
hinted that the situation of de facto decentralisation may favour the introduction of PBF as
fewer battles have to be fought at the central level and local agents may be more used to dealing
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with external parties [59,60]. However, what a series of documents (including on the DR
Congo) have tended to highlight is how the lack of formal decentralisation, or botched decen-
tralisation processes, have in fact hindered the development of PBF because competences and
responsibilities are unclear or disputed between different health authorities.
An issue that is well-mentioned, though, is the weakness, and the consequent flexibility, of
existing institutions and the room for institutional change that characterizes FCAS settings,
especially in the immediate post-conflict period. Toonen and colleagues [32], discussing the
case of the introduction of PBF pilots in Rwanda, points out that the country “was faced with a
post-war situation in which institutions and governance structures were practically non-exis-
tent. So setting up new (PBF) institutions where an NGO acted as the purchaser (the AAP–
Agence d’Achat de Performance) did not pose too much of a problem. In Mali and Ghana, the
healthcare sectors do have governance institutions and ‘rules of the game.’ This provides dif-
ferent constraints, and different opportunities. [. . .] Particularly in those countries with a
well-established health architecture, such as most West African countries, a contracting
approach like RBF needs to be embedded in the prevailing national governance structures”
(p. 9). Indeed, in some of the countries considered, such as Burundi, Rwanda and Coˆte
d’Ivoire, PBF was adopted and ‘codified’ during the post-conflict reorganization of national
policies and strategies [36,41,61].
Related to this issue is a more specific hypothesis (hypothesis 7) that interests and power
relations may be less entrenched in FCAS and, therefore, they are less likely to resist PBF
or push for its ‘indigenization’. There are few documents that refer to this, but Bertone et al.
[62] make the case that in Sierra Leone, professional groups were less powerful and routines
less established after the war, which made them less likely to unite against health system
reforms. This may not be the case of all FCAS countries. Countries such as Comoros, Mali,
Nigeria and Cameroon suffered a conflict that is (or was) less damaging or affected only a
portion of the country. In those cases pre-existing formal and informal institutions may
be stronger and in a better position to shape the way PBF is implemented and its potential
effectiveness.
Exploring patterns of design and adaption
In relation to our expectation that there might be more variation and adaptation in PBF
models in FCAS (hypothesis 8), our analysis of the existing documentation shows that, after
its early development notably in Rwanda, PBF has subsequently been designed and imple-
mented in very similar, almost identical ways in most of the settings. The only notable excep-
tion concerns the pragmatic adaptations to PBF made at implementation stage when the
programme faced unexpected contextual events, such as the Ebola epidemic in West Africa,
recrudescence of armed conflict in Nigeria and CAR, or influx of refugees from other regions
in Cameroon. These adaptations were related less to capacity issues than the crisis-prone
contexts. In Sierra Leone, the national PBF project kept providing services during the Ebola
outbreak, although it was decided to discontinue the verification procedures due to the impos-
sibility and risks of travels [44]. In Guinea, a new PBF project is being adapted to cover system
functions relevant to the epidemic, such as notification and confirmation of Ebola cases, con-
tact searching, and appropriate burial measures [63]. In northern Nigeria, during the humani-
tarian crisis caused by Boko Haram’s insurgency, PBF contracts continued with the clinics
which were still functioning, providing funds for facilities and incentives for health workers.
At the same time, in districts where IDP camps were set, camp clinics were established and
sub-contracted by nearby PBF primary contract holders. In heavily affected districts mobile
clinics were set up, based in nearby safe areas and contracted to carry out a ‘hit and run’
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strategy which consisted in entering into insurgency affected areas following security clearance
to provide health services.
Following the 2013–2014 humanitarian crisis in CAR and Cameroon, the existing PBF pro-
grammes were adapted to increase the proportion of population to be exempted from fees. In
CAR, while under normal conditions facilities are allowed to provide services for free to the
very poor for a maximum of 20% of the services provided (these services are paid 4 times more
than the corresponding indicator for non-poor), the exempted population can increase to 50%
or 100% of patients in case of humanitarian crisis [64]. Similarly, in the eastern regions of Cam-
eroon with a high number of refugees from CAR, the (already existing) extra payment to cover
for free services provided to the very poor, which was capped at 10%, was increased to 20%
for the duration of the crisis [65]. Additionally, the current World Bank pilot in CAR (which
started in early 2017) has been designed to respond to the early recovery conditions, including a
“vulnerability score” in facilities’ bonus calculations, which provides higher payments to less
secure areas, as well as a “quality improvement bonus”. This is a cash-based, non-performance-
based bonus to be used to recruit new staff where facilities lack qualified personnel, rehabilitate
infrastructure and purchase essential equipment [66]. Given the early stage of the PBF pro-
gramme, it is not possible to assess the functioning and effectiveness of these mechanisms.
Exploring patterns of implementation and health system effects
In relation to our ninth hypothesis on the challenges of sustaining PBF in FCAS contexts,
comparatively less information was uncovered in the documents retrieved. In some cases,
these are evidenced by the case of start-stop(-start) funding in some countries. The best docu-
mented case is that of Chad, where a recent study [46] stressed that, while external entrepre-
neurs (in that case, the World Bank) proved sufficient for a ‘superficial’ adoption of PBF and
its introduction as pilot, the external influence was not enough to sustain the project, which
was discontinued 20 months later. Discussions are now on-going in Chad for a possible new
start of the programme (personal communication). A similar case of start-stop approach, fol-
lowed by discussion about a possible re-introduction of PBF, in Sierra Leone has not yet been
fully documented. However, other cases in non-FCAS countries and areas (such as Benin or
southern Mali—[67]) point to the fact that start-stop approaches and lack of sustainability are
not specific to fragile settings. Overall, it appears that, in countries where PBF is introduced as
part of a wider set of health system and health financing reforms, based on a results-orienta-
tion, PBF may be more likely to be sustained. Some FCAS countries, such as Rwanda and
Burundi, provide positive examples of this at least.
In relation to our expectation of variable PBF health system effects in FCAS (hypothesis
10), there are limitations in the literature in terms of how far health system effects are reported,
as well as the difficulty of attribution of changes to PBF. We found very limited evidence of, or
explicit reference to, contextual interaction with direct as well as indirect apparent effects of
PBF on governance, financing, human resources and drugs supplies for some of the FCAS
countries reviewed.
Governance and health information. It has been argued that PBF could act as a tool to
reinforce the overall governance of the health system [7,68]. Little empirical evidence exists so
far, in particular concerning how elements of the context can affect the influence of PBF on
governance. Among the studies reviewed, Remme et al. [39] stress that PBF did reinforce cer-
tain elements of good governance in a pilot in CAR, especially at provider level, and so did the
process evaluation in Zimbabwe [69]. In Haiti, the introduction of PBF forced the government
to beef up the State’s health data reporting system for validation of activities performed; how-
ever the 2016 Hurricane Matthew appears to have halted this process [70].
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As with other pillars discussed below, it is likely that different types of fragility (e.g. humani-
tarian/ political crisis, early recovery, transition, or chronic fragility) would affect the relation
between PBF and governance in different ways, and also that the levels of the system would
also be differentially affected. For example, PBF could reinforce governance at local level (e.g.
that of the providers towards patients and communities), especially in extremely fragile con-
texts where the state or national authorities play a marginal role in service provision and regu-
lation, but could have a much less significant role in terms of reinforcing governance and
stewardship of higher levels, especially when the PBF adoption process is externally driven,
and where ownership and capacity for implementation by local authorities is low [39,46,71].
Health financing. A synergy has been noted between PBF and user fee removal (for
example in Burundi—[10]), with the former replacing facility income lost through the latter.
While this is not specific to FCAS, there is an even stronger case for removing fees for essential
services during crises, and in countries or sub-regions affected by conflict (such as northern
Mali—[72]), this has been a rationale for PBF introduction. However, this linkage is also prob-
lematic if the funding for PBF is limited and there is an expectation that PBF will incentivize
and fund quality improvements; clearly if it is merely substituting for user fees in an under-
funded system, then quality improvements cannot realistically be expected [73].
The relationship between PBF payments and overall facility income will be important to its
effects in all settings, and in many FCAS, such as Chad, PBF is the only financing source for
providers along with user fees [74]. Whether this is more common in FCAS is yet to be estab-
lished though.
Human resources for health. As for facilities, similarly for individual health workers, it is
possible that PBF bonus may represent a higher proportion of their income in FCAS where sal-
aries are (often) lower and less regularly paid and there may be fewer opportunities for highly-
paid private practice. Some evidence exists on the proportion of PBF within the income of
health workers for Sierra Leone, where PBF represents about 16% of the salary and 10% of
total income for primary health workers in rural facilities [75] and Chad. In Chad, evidence is
based on an example of only two health workers: PBF represented respectively 79% and 45%
of salary for a vaccinator and nursing aide [74]. In contrast, the average bonus payment per
month for nursing staff is approximately 10% of their average monthly salary in Tanzania [76].
Another issue concerns how the individual PBF bonus was shared within the facility, where
a tension between a focus on performance and cultural expectations of solidarity may exist.
One of the documents reviewed, focusing on Chad, describes how facilities took the decision
to share the bonus not on the basis of individual performance, as it should be done according
to Chad’s PBF implementation manual, but based on cadre and seniority (which is the
approach preferred in most PBF schemes) in order to reduce tensions and ensure solidarity
[74]. In Sierra Leone, a study of PBF [75] found both instances of solidarity (i.e., sharing bonus
also with non-eligible staff to ensure that all workers receive an income) and tensions between
health workers because of the distribution was perceived as unfair, or because of misappropria-
tion of bonuses. It is likely that this issue is not related to FCAS status (see for Tanzania—
[76]), but rather to specific cultural and social values in each setting. Two studies from Nigeria
[77,78] discuss how a number of contextual and implementation factors affect the motivation
of health workers and the effectiveness of PBF implementation. These factors included: uncer-
tainty in earnings due to delays in payment, lack of communication, and lack of knowledge
concerning the tool used to assess individual performance; lack of understanding of the P4P
scheme; variations in the role of health facility managers; and differences in infrastructure
availability between facilities.
Drugs and infrastructure. Not much information was found on the effect of PBF pro-
grammes on the drugs and pharmaceutical regulation pillar. Because of security issues, absence
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of a formal private retailing sector at the peripheral level, and the less-than-consolidated distri-
bution lines, health programmes’ pharmaceutical procurement and distribution functions in
FCAS are often centralized. Even in those PBF programmes guaranteeing local financial
autonomy and access to banks (as in Chad and CAR), local managers were reported to depend
on the state’s systems for drugs provision.
Beyond the capacity to adapt in acute humanitarian situations described above, the docu-
ments reviewed seem to show that PBF mechanisms are less able to address the issue of reha-
bilitation and equipment of facilities in recovery settings, unless coupled with extra, non
performance-based funding. As a result, a number of cash or in-kind bonuses have been
introduced in PBF programmes (e.g. Adamawa State in Nigeria, CAR, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Haiti—
[56,66,79,80]). Though this problem may be starker in FCAS settings, a study in Tanzania
(non-FCAS) noted a similar point. It stressed that it is important to consider contextual issues
when implementing PBF schemes in low income settings, and highlighted the importance of
basic infrastructure and staff being available before implementing the scheme, as these con-
straints are beyond the control of providers and managers [81].
Discussion
This review of the published and (largely) unpublished literature has examined a neglected
area: the effect of context on the adoption, adaption, implementation and health system effects
of PBF, focused on FCAS settings where many of the PBF programmes have been imple-
mented. Our findings, still tentative in the absence of more evidence, do suggest that PBF has
been commonly adopted in FCAS settings, and also earlier on in the history of the expansion
of PBF. PBF in these contexts appears to have followed in the footsteps of contracting, which
was previously the favoured model for donors supporting service delivery in FCAS settings.
Our hypotheses on why FCAS settings might offer more opportunities for PBF were largely
supported by the documentary evidence, although it is clear that many of these elements are
not exclusive to FCAS settings—though perhaps commonly more extreme in them. A few
broad elements, such as lack of trust, both within the health and governance system but also
between government and donors, emerged as important factors. How these elements are then
affected by PBF—for example, whether trust is rebuilt or merely circumvented—is not yet
clear.
Another factor which emerged is the fluidity of institutions and the influence of external
actors (in particular, a limited number of key agencies). Indeed, going beyond PBF, this article
is a study of how a ‘new’ idea in global health and international aid has spread and adapted, or
not, to national and local environments. It complements the growing body of literature on the
adoption, diffusion, and change of global norms, ideologies and ideas in international develop-
ment and health [82–84]. In particular, the paper looks at the place and agency of national
actors [85,86] in a context marked by conflict and the professionalization of international
development [87].Our analysis of how the PBF concept was diffused by organisations and indi-
viduals across FCAS settings is not necessarily exclusive to PBF and may link to wider trends
in aid dependent countries. It has been documented in health financing [88] and in interna-
tional development more generally [87]. Working on the diffusion of innovations in health,
Fitzgerald et al. [89] point out the important role of social mediation and intermediation,
something clearly visible in the case of PBF and its travelling experts and community of prac-
tice. Additionally, our finding on the lack of governmental ownership and donors’ influence
around PBF adoption echoes that of a recent study [90], which also includes Rwanda, Burundi,
DR Congo; and our finding on the role of some individuals in the diffusion of PBF is in line
with Shroff et al. [49]’s analysis of the scale-up of PBF programmes in 11 countries, including
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in some FCAS settings, which mentions the presence of ‘global health financing experts in the
country’ as a key enabler for countries like Burundi, Rwanda, Cameroon and Mozambique.
The influence of such experts and institutions is not peculiar to FCAS but, in line with the crit-
ical development studies literature [91] and in light of the flexibility of institutions and weaker
position of local elites mentioned above, it seems likely that external experts and institutions
are more influential in FCAS and that their legacy can stretch over a few countries.
Similarly, Barnes et al. [92] examine the emergence of the PBF concept, focusing on three,
non-FCAS countries (Tanzania, South Africa and Zambia). They conclude that there is a
degree of capture by external agencies, and that participation for Africans depends on position
within government, relationships with funders and awareness of informal opportunities. They
conclude that “a source of African agency lies in the strength of the country’s health system”
(p. iii) [92], which, if true, has important implications for FCAS. Push-back on the PBF con-
cept from South Africa is cited as an example. They identify clear commitment to PBF at inter-
national and national levels, despite weakness of the evidence, because of the ‘political capital’
it gives to those working to promote it. The authors see this as the main reason for the lack of
critical engagement with the concept, normatively or practically.
In their analysis, Barnes at al. [92] also highlight the lack of appreciation of the context-
specific nature of PBF and of the causes of its success or failure to date. Indeed, what emerges
from our analysis is the fact that explicit justifications of the rationale for the adoption of PBF
in relation to contextual needs are extremely limited and -it appears- little consideration is
given in the documents we reviewed to the more granular specificities of the context and how
they may affect adoption, adaption and design, implementation and effects of PBF. For exam-
ple, the documents we reviewed provide almost no mention of the local contextual factors that
may have influenced the take-off of PBF in Rwanda, one of the very first schemes and probably
the most cited of all. However, the grey and academic literature on government in Rwanda has
taken a great interest in the idea of imihigo [93–95], a traditional concept that can be under-
stood as a ‘performance contract’ between an authority and citizens, which has been ‘modern-
ised’ and institutionalised by the Rwandan government. Has imihigo provided a fertile ground
for PBF in Rwanda? This is a possibility but it would need to be evidenced by further research.
However, only one of the document we reviewed mentions imihigo, to stress the risk possibility
of bias in PBF evaluation [96].
Contextual elements are likely to strongly affect the relevance of PBF adoption, and the
lack of analysis of contextual needs and features hinders the adaptation of PBF design and
the detailed assessment of the relationship between effects and local context. This may pro-
mote externally-favoured, rigid models [97]. Narratives of success of PBF in other settings
are commonly cited in the policy adoption process, but whether these are potent or cover
more direct persuasive factors such as the availability of funding from donors is uncertain.
Some of the early PBF literature (for example, [27]) already noted the potential problem of
transferring policy recommendations across different settings, highlighting that not just the
need for strong political support but also that adaptive health systems, ability to absorb risk
and strong information systems are required for the implementation of PBF. (The costs of
monitoring are of course closely tied to the functionality and robustness of information sys-
tems). Contexts also influence the likely internal distribution of rewards within a scheme
(e.g. rewarding facilities in more densely populated areas as against those with remote popu-
lations). The Cochrane review of 2012 [13] also highlighted the likely impact of different
organisational settings, which was then under-studied. More recently, Renmans et al. [16]
highlighted the importance of context, including the role of ideology and values in shaping
PBF, while noting that studies do not provide in-depth analysis of how contexts affect imple-
mentation and results.
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In relation to implementation, we do find a degree of adaptation to different FCAS con-
texts, particularly humanitarian settings, where the suitability of PBF as a financing model
merits more exploration. It is harder, however, to identify patterns on sustainability and health
system effects, partly because of the early stage of many programmes, but also because of the
limited documentation and the varied settings. With a few patchy exceptions, the documents
available lack a detailed assessment of health system effects and PBF is treated as a stand-alone
funding mechanism rather than as an integrated health reform with impact on financing, but
also human resources, health information systems, governance, drug supply, etc. Issues such
as the integration of PBF within wider health financing modes are neglected. In this respect,
more than answering, the review raises questions. For example, is there evidence that PBF is
better adapted to specific types of FCAS settings (for example, early recovery rather than
reconstruction, when more significant infrastructural investments might be needed)? How is
it affected by different levels of pre-existing autonomy at facility level (e.g. some of the FCAS
countries permitted facility financial management prior to PBF, which was relatively rare pre-
viously in more stable settings)? Can PBF be seen, is some contexts, as a continuation of the
practice of humanitarian organisations in topping up salaries?
This review has clear limitations. Although we used a number of channels to try to obtain
all relevant operational documents and reports on PBF programmes in FCAS countries, we
will not have been able to find all. In particular, questions around factors driving adoption and
political economy are sensitive and tend to be under-documented. To explore these in depth
would require primary data collection through interviews and other qualitative methods,
which is planned in the next stage of this work. We also recognise that the FCAS classification
is easily challenged and very heterogeneous internally, as well as changing over time. Finally,
the fact that we focused our search only on the literature concerning the health sector does not
allow us to compare the use of (or lack thereof) performance approaches in other public sec-
tors and address important questions pertaining to the reasons why PBF approaches started
and seemed to find more fertile grounds in the health sector, and were only later, and so far
more rarely, adopted in other sectors such as education. Rather than a review of grey and pol-
icy documents, interviews with policy-makers would probably help better understand those
dynamics.
Conclusion
While context is recognised to be important in a number of studies on PBF in low and middle
income settings, this aspect has not been interrogated in any detail to date. Our analysis took a
theory-led literature review approach and interrogated available published and grey literature
to examine the relationship between FCAS contexts and the adoption, adaption, implementa-
tion and health system effects of PBF. We found that, within low and middle income countries,
PBF has been more common in FCAS contexts, which were also more commonly early adopt-
ers. Very little explanation of the rationale for its adoption, in particular in relation with
the contextual features, is given in programme documents. However, there are a number of
factors which could explain this, including the greater role of external actors and donors, a
greater openness to institutional reform, and lower levels of trust within the public system and
between government and donors, all of which favour more contractual approaches. These sug-
gest that rather than emerging despite fragility, conditions of fragility may favour the rapid
emergence of PBF.
Overall, our analysis highlights the need for greater clarity on how PBF interacts with the
contexts, and in particular with FCAS feature, both ex ante (at the stage of adoption and
design/adaption) and ex post (during the implementation and the assessment of health system
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effects). A few, emerging adaptations of PBF, focused to humanitarian settings are docu-
mented, as well as some (limited) evidence of health system effects which may be contextually
driven, but both of these areas require more in-depth analyses. They should also help explore a
crucial question: the extent to which PBF is reinforcing—or not—fragile states. We also note
the important role of early ‘reference cases’ and the prominence of certain implementers and
funding organisations in spreading the PBF concept across FCAS (and non-FCAS) settings.
Another area meriting more study is the political economy of PBF and its diffusion across
contexts.
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